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 UN peace operations at a 
crossroads 
Mateja Peter 
The mandates of recent UN peacekeeping operations show substantial 
innovation in the thinking of the UN Security Council. The 
authorization of a Force Intervention Brigade, the use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles, a focus on strategic communication and intelligence, 
and peacebuilding mandates in the midst of ongoing conflicts – have 
all expanded the scope of activities of UN missions. These develop-
ments have prompted questions over the future direction of UN peace 
operations. Has the UN the capabilities to command, support and 
implement more robust operations? What are the implications for the 
Capstone Doctrine and the peacekeeping principles of consent, 
impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence and 
defence of the mandate?1 And more generally, what are the limits of UN 
actions to support peace?  
Since the turn of the millennium, both practice and scholarship 
have stressed the importance of protection of civilians as a peace-
keeping priority, the inclusion of gender perspectives in all efforts 
aimed at promoting and maintaining peace and security, and linking 
peacekeeping activities to peacebuilding and political processes. Link-
ages with special political missions are particularly important but have 
received less attention in policy debates. How might all these recent 
advances in thinking about peace and security be affected by new 
developments in peacekeeping? What are the implications of the new 
peacekeeping reality on the identity of the UN as a whole?  
In October 2014, the UN Secretary-General appointed a High-Level 
Independent Panel to review UN peacekeeping and special political 
missions. The 17-member panel works under the leadership of the 
1996 Nobel Peace Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta (Timor-Leste). The panel 
has been encouraged by the Secretary-General and other senior UN 
figures to be bold and creative in its recommendations. Members are 
expected to produce a joint report by June 2015. The Secretary-General 
will submit this report to the Security Council and the General 
                                                             
1  United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 
Department of Peacekeeping, 18 January 2008. 
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Assembly, together with his own recommendations. It is anticipated 
that the General Assembly will consider these during its autumn 2015 
session. The report of the previous high-level panel, the ’Brahimi 
report’,2 has had considerable impact on the reform and direction of UN 
peacekeeping in the decade following its release. It is thus anticipated 
that what will undoubtedly become known as the ‘Ramos-Horta report’ 
will have a similar impact on the direction of UN peace operations in 
the decade to come. 
The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) has been at 
the forefront of research on peace operations since their inception. This 
compendium draws on recent work conducted by researchers at the 
institute and is meant to provide scholarly insights on the issues the 
panel is grappling with. As reflected in the wide variety in the contri-
butions presented here, security, conflict and peace have been and 
remain a research priority at NUPI.  
The work on this compendium was generously supported by the 
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A special thank you to 
Paul Troost and Liv Høivik for help with the formatting, and Susan 
Høivik for language proofing the compendium. 
                                                             
2  United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi 
report), A/55/305–S/2000/809, August 2000. 
 Section 1: Conflict and peace 
trends 
Broad trends 
 
Morten Bøås 
Peacekeeping has never been easy, but the current context of broad 
and ambitious mandates combined with instructions to use force 
robustly may present even further challenges. If recent conflict trends 
can be taken as a guide to ongoing and future peacekeeping opera-
tions, the field will continue to be characterized by complex missions 
conducted in politically difficult terrains. There is no clear endgame in 
sight. Missions dispatched to facilitate the production of peace must 
grapple with weak states and increasingly unpopular national leaders 
with low levels of legitimacy. Such missions may easily end up fighting 
or attempting to control armed non-state actors that are hard to defeat 
in battle and also have agendas that leave little room for a negotiated 
settlement to the conflict. Moreover, these missions will probably be 
conducted in areas where local livelihoods are under pressure from a 
range of external shocks, including increased climatic variability; and 
the states in question are rarely seen as actors able to offer their local 
populations much support. Indeed, often the states will be seen as 
being part of the problem and not the solution.3  
This ʻmessinessʼ of things to come is readily observable in various 
areas in which the UN is currently engaged in various peace operations, 
like the Mali, the Central African Republic, and the eastern provinces of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Even if each mission has its 
own set of unique challenges, there are also certain commonalities that 
must be thought through carefully, because ever more robust and 
comprehensive mandates are not going to solve these.  
First, it must be acknowledged that many armed non-state actors 
today do not fit the established categories of insurgencies, like national 
liberation, separatism, revolution or warlordism.4 The new generation 
of insurgencies, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are 
                                                             
3  See Morten Bøås (2014) ʻGuns, money and prayers: AQIM’s blueprint for securing 
control of Northern Maliʼ, CTC Sentinel, 7 (4): 1–7. 
4  See Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn (2013) ‘Understanding African guerrillas: from 
liberation struggles to warlordism and international terrorism?’, in James J. Hentz 
(ed.) Routledge Handbook of African Security. London: Routledge, pp. 85–95. 
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both deeply local and undeniably global at the same time. Branding 
has become an integral part of their strategy. These actors may be 
religious fundamentalists, but they are also pragmatic and very good at 
appropriating local grievances for their own purposes. Most of them 
also operate in a setting where there is little state control or state legiti-
macy, and where local livelihoods are under immense pressure due to a 
combination of increased climatic variability and the inability of the 
states to react adequately to this. And as these non-state actors are not 
seeking to capture the state or to break away from a state, but are chal-
lenging the very concept of modern statehood, there are scant margins 
for a negotiated settlement. Finally, since most of these actors also 
seem to be very hard to defeat in military terms, the UN finds itself 
attempting to control conflict situations to which solutions may be very 
hard to find 
This is not made any easier by the fact that most peacekeeping 
operations are and will continue to struggle with limited capacity – 
perhaps achieving nominal daytime control of conflict-prone areas, at 
best. Moreover, the space available to national leaders for making 
strategic decisions is often severely constrained. This means that peace 
processes attempted and sponsored by the international community at 
large or certain concerned stakeholders will not achieve much, as 
national leaders cannot make the essential decisions needed, or the 
main armed actors are simply not present at the table.  
 
Overlapping systems of governance 
 
Morten Bøås 
UN peacekeeping operations are by definition state-focused. That 
makes them poorly equipped to deal with the overlapping systems of 
formal and informal governance nested around much of the zones of 
conflict today. Armed struggles have always been in a constant state of 
flux. However, with more and more new technologies, strategies, and 
pathways to resistance emerging, insurgencies adapt and new ones 
appear on the scene. Global and regional forces – be they political, 
economic, or social – impact on the context of the armed struggles in 
multiple, and often unpredictable, ways. In some cases, local causes of 
conflicts become interconnected, intertwined, and layered, producing a 
constantly shifting landscape.  
It is important to acknowledge that armed insurgencies are not only 
forces of disorder: they are equally parts of emerging systems of gover-
nance. What we see today where armed insurgencies exist is that a 
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monopolized system of governance has either broken down completely 
or has become so weakened that competing systems have emerged.5  
These new systems are characterized by flexibility and adaptability. 
Their actors compete to become the nodal point between various 
networks of attempted informal governance that collaborate, but they 
also compete and are at times in violent conflict with each other. The 
fluidity of these networks may be seen in the continuing existence – 
but changing function – of regional and local ‘big men’ within these 
armed insurgencies. In many conflict-prone societies, the new forms, 
and the increasing degree to which the ‘big men’ (and their networks of 
governance) are connected to other regional and international 
networks and markets, lead to networks increasingly characterized by 
adaptability and pragmatic shifting of alliances. 
This can be seen in the dual dynamic unfolding in parts of Africa, as 
in the eastern DRC. On the one hand, there is the drive whereby 
regional ‘big men’ operate in a downward direction to capitalize on 
local grievances, largely for their own benefit (take the history of the 
CNDP and M23, both of which relied heavily on top–down leadership 
by regional big men). On the other hand, there is the evolution of local 
defence forces/militias moving upwards and becoming intertwined in 
larger networks and markets – in the process, producing new regional 
big men. Take, for example, the proliferation of Mayi-Mayi and other 
local self-defence militias as the Raia Mutomboki that originally 
emerged as grassroots responses to the abuses perpetrated by the 
FDLR. Regardless of the internal dynamics, new networks of power and 
rule are constructed, challenging – and replacing – existing systems of 
governance. What we see are complex political configurations that 
have shifted away from monopolized systems of governance and 
patronage to one characterized by a multitude of competing actors and 
networks of patronage and shifting alliances. In consequence, 
peacekeeping operations are confronted with a field in constant flux 
and fragmentation, where the important dimension to keep track of is 
not so much the actual agents of violence, but the nodal points in these 
networks of governance and violence, and their ability to maintain 
networks across space and time. Only by having an understanding of 
these networks and how they work can the international community 
offer an approach to policy that make these networks less integral 
elements in the daily livelihood struggles of the local population.6 
 
                                                             
5  Ibid. 
6  See Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim (2013) ‘The trouble in Mali – corruption, 
collusion, resistance’, Third World Quarterly 34 (7): 1279–1292. 
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Relevance of the UN Security Council 
 
Niels Nagelhus Schia 
The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the most important international 
decision-making body, with primary responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and security.7 It is empowered to make legitimate 
and binding decisions, including mandates for peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding missions. That means that the legitimacy of UN 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations rests on the legitimacy of the 
Council’s decisions. The Council is the only arena where such decisions 
can be made: it is good, but not perfect. The Council depends on being 
perceived as relevant to all 193 UN member states. To be relevant, its 
decisions must be seen as both legitimate and efficient. However, the 
growing use of informal processes and shadow mechanisms in the 
Council is challenging the balance between these two considerations.  
Member states are again calling for reform of the composition of the 
UNSC. Previous attempts have been blocked by the veto of the P5 
(permanent members). Instead of changing the formal composition, a 
reform should focus on:  
 enhancing the transparency and democratic procedures of the 
Council’s current decision-making process and the informal 
parts of this process;  
 enhancing the influence of the E10 (elected members) in the 
Council so they can participate in the decision-making proces-
ses in the same way as the P5 (for instance, all members states 
should be ‘penholders’ on a regular basis);  
 addressing the changes in the global balance of power by 
incorporating a new layer of member states or regional organi-
zations in the Council;  
 establishing more systematic and coherent relations with 
regional organizations, particularly relevant when mandating 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations;  
 improving the dynamics of the Council’s working methods so  
that they can better address and respond to emerging conflicts.  
                                                             
7  See Niels Nagelhus Schia (forthcoming 2015) Bureaucrats in Peaceland: How 
intentions travel from New York to Liberia. PhD dissertation. Institute of Social 
Anthropology, University of Oslo; Niels Nagelhus Schia (2013) ‘Being part of the 
parade – going native in the United Nations Security Council’, Political and Legal 
Anthropology Review (PoLAR) 36(1): 138–156. 
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As a result of the Council’s growing workload, new and less formal 
ways of approaching cases before they are dealt with around the horse-
shoe table have become more common and almost institutionalized 
(like the ‘penholder function’). With this trend, the decision-making 
process in the Council is being shifted further away from the formal 
arenas – which in turn means that member states will invest 
increasingly in shadow decision-making processes in the Council. That 
is not to say that having a place at the table has become irrelevant: a 
country's chances of influencing matters backstage are greater when it 
is also a member of the UNSC. However, these informal processes could 
be improved, made more democratic, transparent and institutionalized 
into the Council’s rules of procedure. 
While informal decision-making processes increase efficiency of the 
Council, they may also decrease the legitimacy of these same decisions. 
These conflicting concerns are equally important for the Council’s 
relevance as regards the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Despite the massive contradictions between the great powers 
during the Cold War, the Security Council has managed to balance 
between these two conflicting concerns for seven decades now. Its 
predecessor, the League of Nations, sacrificed efficiency to increase 
legitimacy: it became irrelevant and was dissolved before completing 
its third decade. The Security Council has evidently been better at 
maintaining its relevance than the League of Nations was. However, 
sacrificing legitimacy for the sake of efficacy could change that.  
With less legitimacy, it will be more difficult in the long run for the 
Security Council to maintain efficiency through its relevance in 
international affairs. In other words, if the Security Council is unable to 
balance these two considerations satisfactorily in the future, it will be 
weakened in its ability to safeguard international peace and security, 
not least in connection with mandating UN peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. Particularly R2P situations trigger this dilemma.  
The good news is that decision-making processes and informal 
processes are easier to reform than matters of formal composition. A 
reform of the informal processes could serve to address and enhance 
both the legitimacy and efficiency of the UN Security Council. 
 
 Section 2: New issues in 
peacekeeping 
Organized crime 
 
Francesco Strazzari 
For more than a decade there has been growing recognition that UN 
peace operations need to include a focus on organized crime. While 
that is a positive development, the outcomes have been elusive to say 
the least, and much remains to be done to operationalize fine-grained 
understanding and strategic planning regarding organized crime in 
contexts emerging from armed conflict. The operationalization of 
organized crime as a driver of state fragility in a given conflict-affected 
region should emerge as the product of the joint activities of specialists 
with backgrounds in political science/sociology, economics/ develop-
ment and criminology/law. However, organized crime continues to be 
seen as primarily a question of law enforcement, at best a judicial 
matter. Moreover, more is needed to improve synergies within the UN 
system: despite efforts to establish a solid base for collaboration 
between UNODC and DPKO, actual cooperation in the field has 
remained fairly episodic. 
Of the 28 UN missions underway in 2013, 10 had organized crime in 
their mandate. Likewise, a growing number of specialized units focus-
ing on organized crime have been established. However, the closing of 
the UN Taskforce on Transnational Organized Crime reflects difficulties 
encountered in this area, not least as regards achieving institutional 
consensus about the policy target. The operationalization of organized 
crime has been obstructed by reductive understandings. For example, 
MINUSMA (Mali) has a Task Force on Organized Crime: it is driven by 
UNPOL, which means that it is highly focused on security and law 
enforcement. Similarly with other missions, starting with UNMIK, the 
first mission to be endowed with counter-organized crime capacity.8  
Definitions of (transnational) organized crime vary depending on 
contexts, sector of activity and organizational culture. All over the 
world, police tend to associate drug-related crime with organized 
crime, regardless of the actual circumstances. Any attempt to under-
stand how organized crime affects local governance, economy and 
                                                             
8  See Francesco Strazzari (2008) ‘L’Oeuvre au Noir: The shadow economy of Kosovo’s 
independence’, International Peacekeeping 15 (2): 155–170. 
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society should be based on a comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon, above all in its ambivalent, non-linear relationship with 
political system stability and violence.9 It is imperative to understand 
how war economies, often involving significant criminal activity, take 
root and become resilient.10 Likewise, there is a need to distinguish 
between organized crime and the more generic crime boom often 
observed in post-conflict situations. Great variation exists across 
regions, countries and local contexts: given the fact that organized 
crime is often invisible, based as it is on connivance and intimidation, 
distinctive methodologies are needed to identify critical areas, assess 
potential damage and strategically plan how to deal with it, gradually 
decoupling crime from politics, so as to make the issue more tractable 
and offer better chances of success.11  
Importantly, experience shows that there is little chance of fighting 
organized crime (especially its mafia-style variant) unless the issue 
features in the public debate, engaging civil society segments especi-
ally sensitive to matters like corruption, development, human rights 
and social justice. Internationally mandated operations have a role to 
play in facilitating this process, supporting forums for discussion and 
targeted research. A key challenge is to establish such forums and 
support those media that can promote debates about strategies and 
policies, so that they can bring into the local context evidence from 
other countries and contexts, to avoid insularity and demagoguery.  
 
New technologies 
 
John Karlsrud 
New technologies can also be used as arguments for more intelligence- 
and technology-driven robust missions.12 However, UN missions do not 
need new technologies in order to become more robust, but to enable 
them to implement their mandates better. UN missions can also use 
these tools to help empower local populations to participate in and 
have more ownership of discussions concerning the future of their 
                                                             
9  See Francesco Strazzari (2014) ‘Captured or capturing? Narcotics and political 
instability along the ‘African Route’ to Europe’, European Review of Organized 
Crime 1 (2): 5–34. 
10  See Francesco Strazzari and Bertine Kamphuis (2012) ‘Hybrid economies and state-
building: on the resilience of the extralegal’, Global Governance 18 (1): 57–72. 
11  See Francesco Strazzari (2012) ‘The informal and the criminal: state-building as an 
extralegal field’,  Südosteuropa. 60 ( 4): 576–590. 
12  See John Karlsrud (forthcoming 2015) ‘Innovation and technology in UN peace 
operations: opportunities and risks’, in Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 
2014, New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University; John 
Karlsrud and Frederik Rosén (2013) ‘In the eye of the beholder? UN and the use of 
drones to protect civilians’, Stability of Security and Development 2(2): 1–10. 
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country – perhaps alleviating some of the democratic deficit that too 
commonly exists. For best results, the UN should link up with the pri-
vate sector and volunteer technological communities (VTCs). Further-
more, the UN should take care that the gathering of data does not harm 
vulnerable host populations – following the ‘do no harm’ principle – 
and make sure that remote sensing does not lead to further ‘bunkeri-
zation’ of UN missions retreating to the safe walls of their compounds. 
New technology can be seen as both an advantage and a challenge 
to the UN. Surveillance drones and commercial satellite image pro-
viders are increasingly becoming an important source of information 
for UN peace operations. They can provide up-to-date images at low 
cost. However, new tools require new capacities – for instance, analysis 
capacity is crucial, and it is not a layman’s task to analyse satellite 
pictures and synthetic aperture radar data. 
Google, Microsoft and other tech giants can help the UN in getting a 
grip on how to sort more effectively through the vast piles of data it 
gathers. Digital ‘exhaust’ can be useful to detect macro-trends – group 
geotagging of mobile phones to detect population movements, using 
sudden spikes in remittances to detect geographical locations where 
tension is looming – and the Secretary-General should find ways for the 
banking, telecoms and remittances industries to share their data 
without revealing business secrets. More direct cooperation with the 
private sector is needed – the engagement of Facebook with the 
humanitarian sector can serve as one possible example. 
Community Alert Networks (CANs), as in the DRC, can alert the UN 
when a situation is emerging, and enable real-time monitoring of 
evolving issues. This will improve the ability of a mission to capture, 
understand and integrate local perceptions into daily decision-making. 
However, the UN must take great care to ensure that members of the 
host population are not treated as second-rate citizens – it might be 
implicitly, but wrongly, assumed that the need to give informed 
consent is a luxury good that does not apply in situations of crisis. 
Using crowd-sourced information can have unintended and negative 
consequences through group or individual re-identification when com-
bined with other information (the ‘mosaic effect’), putting civilians in 
danger of persecution, torture or death.  
There is also a real danger that technology will speed up the ten-
dency for troops, civilians and humanitarians to retreat to the safe 
walls of their compounds. Greater knowledge creates greater responsi-
bility. The UN should resist ‘bunkerization’ of UN peace operations, 
and use technology and innovation to enable peace operations to 
match the greater knowledge that technology can give with increased 
mobility and agility, and the requisite will to implement their man-
dates. In the calls for more and better technology there lies the inherent 
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danger of distancing ourselves from those we aim to help, and shifting 
the burden of accountability from helpers to receivers.  
 
Cybersecurity  
 
Lilly Muller and Niels Nagelhus Schia 
Peace operations cannot afford to ignore emerging security trends. 
Including a focus on cybersecurity in UN peace operations can improve 
the level of global cybersecurity, enhance the sustainability of peace-
building processes in post-conflict countries and contribute to 
economic growth, infrastructure and development in post-conflict 
countries. In order to secure access there is a need for mainstreaming of 
cyber education, awareness and various structural and cyber-specific 
‘add-ons’ into the civilian and policing dimensions of peace opera-
tions. This includes training of judges, police and prosecutors in the 
host countries, as well as developing investigative methods for 
computer-related crimes and electronic criminal evidence. It is crucial 
that states receive the technology they need to use and utilize 
cyberspace; however education, awareness and infrastructure must 
follow this access. This will require awareness of the importance and 
challenges that cyberspace holds, in all phases of UN peace operations.  
Interconnectivity via digital networks is the key characteristic of 
today’s global economy and communication, and is increasingly 
required for global economic stability and development.13 Neverthe-
less, providing or securing such interconnectivity is not included in 
peacebuilding. Cyberspace is a cornerstone of all societies today: this 
includes fragile states, countries in conflict and post-conflict countries. 
Many African countries, also those categorized as fragile states, are 
experiencing substantial economic growth. In the past decade, seven of 
the world’s ten fastest-growing economies were in Africa. Increased 
and improved technology and access to cyberspace are facilitating this 
growth. Many African countries are making huge leaps into wireless 
telephony, avoiding the cost/effort detour involved in using expensive 
copper cables. This trend is confirmed by UN figures which show a 
rapid increase in mobile phone subscriptions, also in post-conflict 
countries hosting UN peacekeeping missions.  
Access to such technology and infrastructure facilitates lines of com-
munication, and can boost a country’s economy and social stability. A 
secure cyberspace affects social and economic factors nationally and 
worldwide, and there is a clear link between national development and 
cyberspace. However dependence on cyber and ICT also increases 
societal vulnerability. The degree of a country’s cyber/infrastructure 
                                                             
13  UNIDIR/2013/3 (2013) The Cyber Index International Security Trends and Realities.  
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technology and capability influences its stability, economy and 
development, and vice versa. Thus, cybersecurity and cyber capacity-
building must be included in peacebuilding.14 Neglecting this may 
have negative effects on the sustainability of peacebuilding processes 
for the long-term governance, development and stability of states. 
The question of access versus institutional stability and framework 
creates key challenges in implementing cyber capabilities. Many 
countries are rapidly increasing their access to cyberspace, without 
having the security and institutional stability to secure it. This can 
result in more damage than benefit to both the state and the local 
economy.15 The challenge here is to create a structure and institutional 
stability as early as possible, and integrate it into the local system. This 
will allow for maximal utilization of the internet and protect users 
against malware. Cyber security should be an integral part of creating 
good governance and institutional stability. We hold that cyber security 
and capability must be included in the early stages of peacebuilding, 
and the infrastructure necessary to reach the tipping point where 
internet access becomes beneficial must be established.16 
                                                             
14  GCSCC (2014) Cyber Security Capacity Maturity Model – Pilot. 
15  David Burt, Paul Nicholas, Kevin Sullivan and Travis Scoles (2014) ‘The 
cybersecurity risk paradox’, Microsoft. 
16  Ibid. 
 Section 3: Peacekeeping doctrine 
Offensive and stabilization mandates  
 
Cedric de Coning 
UN stabilization operations require a new doctrine, one that is separate 
from the existing UN peacekeeping principles, identity and approach. 
When the UN Security Council – as a last resort – mandates the UN to 
undertake stability and offensive operations, the UN should not have to 
do this on the basis of the existing peacekeeping doctrine and its blue 
helmet identity. A new UN stabilization doctrine with a matching 
identity should be developed to provide guidance on what would be 
required, should the UN be tasked with such mandates.17  
Such a new stabilization doctrine can help to protect UN peace-
keeping doctrine and identity from being misapplied in unsuited con-
texts. It can also help the UN to maintain credibility and legitimacy by 
ensuring that when the Security Council opts to mandate the UN to 
undertake stabilization operations, it can do so knowing that there is 
an appropriate doctrine with the requisite capacities in place to ensure 
that the UN mission is prepared for the task assigned to it.18 
The missions in CAR (MINUSCA), the DRC (MONUSCO) and Mali 
(MINUSMA), taken together with AMISOM in Somalia and the new 
Multi-National Joint Task Force (MJTF) mission against Boko Haram in 
the Lake Chad basin, represent a new category of stabilization opera-
tions. These missions are tasked with protecting the government and its 
people against an aggressor. They have several features in common: 
 they operate in the midst of ongoing conflicts;  
 they are mandated to contribute to restoring an maintaining 
stability, by helping to protect a government and its people 
against identified aggressors; 
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 they operate in support of and alongside local security forces 
that have the primary responsibility for protecting their govern-
ment and citizens 
 they are mandated to use force robustly in the face of antici-
pated attacks against them and those they are tasked to protect. 
In the case of the FIB in eastern DRC, AMISOM in Somalia and 
the MJTF in the Lake Chad basin, they are also tasked to under-
take offensive operations to forcefully disarm the aggressors, or 
to degrade their capacity to continue their insurgency and to 
enforce stability.  
However, these stabilization missions should not be misunderstood as 
a military solution to a conflict. They should be seen as part of a larger 
strategy for proactively shaping the security environment, by con-
taining the aggressors in order to create space for political solutions. 
The tension between the established UN peacekeeping principles of 
consent, impartiality and the limited use of force, and these new 
stabilization missions is rooted in the fact that in each of these missions 
the UN Security Council has identified aggressors that need to be con-
tained.19 The aggressors are framed outside the context of (legitimate) 
'parties to the conflict’, because they have opted to use violence to 
pursue their objectives. However, the short-term focus on containment 
does not preclude them from joining the peace process downstream. 
Until such time, the Security Council has identified them as aggressors, 
and the UN mission does not require their consent, is not impartial, and 
has been mandated to use force to contain them. 
There has been a significant shift in the orientation of UN peace-
keeping over the last decade, from conflict resolution to conflict 
management. A decade ago, most UN peacekeepers were engaged in 
post-conflict peace agreement implementation missions in countries 
like Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia and Sudan. Today, approximately 
two thirds of the UN’s peacekeepers are deployed in the midst of 
ongoing conflict in missions where there is no ‘peace’ to ‘keep’.  
Over this same period the UN has developed significant operational 
political and peacemaking capacities. As a result, a division of work 
has emerged: UN peacekeeping missions are increasingly limited to 
containing violence, whereas UN special political missions and special 
envoys are tasked with seeking enduring political solutions. 
 
  
                                                             
19  The M23, FDLR and other armed groups in DRC, AQIM in Mali, Seleka and anti-
Baleka in CAR, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in the MJTF. 
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Enforcement peacekeeping 
 
Mateja Peter 
The United Nations is moving into a new era of enforcement 
peacekeeping.20 This has manifested itself both in the enforcement of 
political solutions through support to government statebuilding 
ambitions in the midst of conflicts, and the enforcement of military 
victories through the offensive use of force. These changes challenge 
all three key peacekeeping principles: consent, impartiality and the 
non-use of force. Such a shift in UN peacekeeping opens the door to 
several unintended but problematic consequences. Has the concept of 
peacekeeping become overstretched? If doctrinal implications of recent 
developments are not properly acknowledged, there will remain a wall 
between operational activities and strategic considerations. For a 
mission to succeed, all stakeholders need to have a shared understand-
ing of what peacekeeping means and what principles it follows. 
In peacekeeping today, the ‘targets’ of peacekeeping actions tend to 
be non-state actors that enjoy little international legitimacy. As a result, 
no comprehensive peace agreements with them are sought before the 
international community takes sides in a conflict. UN peacekeeping has 
come to bear a startling resemblance to stabilization missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact that the short-term results have been at 
best mixed, and the longer-term objectives unaccomplished, should 
hold lessons for UN peacekeeping. If ‘enforcement peacekeeping’ 
remains under the peacekeeping umbrella, support should be lent to 
structures that consider its longer-term implications for peacebuilding 
and how supporting one side in a conflict affects regional dynamics 
and peace processes. For these missions, context sensitivity is of 
paramount importance.  
Abrogation of peacekeeping principles is bound to carry unintended 
consequences. While the full extent may be difficult to foresee, given 
the stakes involved for both the hosting states and the future of UN 
peacekeeping, such assessment is needed as part of strategic 
considerations before missions are authorized. Security of international 
personnel and civilians, and mandate implementation could become 
complicated. If peacekeepers take sides in a conflict, that may well lead 
to increased resistance among disenfranchised groups likely to take 
action against the mission and other international presence. Moreover, 
the increasing robustness of missions and their expanding mandates 
seem set to complicate their success and later drawdown. 
UN peace operations should be wary of assuming specific political 
solutions. When UN peacekeepers side with one side in a conflict, 
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whether by helping it ‘extend state authority’ or defeat enemy combat-
ants, that substantially affects conflict and political dynamics. Conflict 
parties against which government and now UN action is directed are 
key players in a conflict. Regardless of their international legitimacy, 
these armed groups or their political reincarnations will need to be 
included in peace settlements if these are to become sustainable. UN 
support for the central government politically and/or militarily empow-
ers one side, and can result in a peace settlement that fails to reflect 
political realities on the ground. This complicates longer-term peace-
building and reconciliation processes 
Finally, there is a need for broader consideration of how enforce-
ment peacekeeping could affect regional dynamics. The conflicts in 
Mali, Somalia, the DRC, the CAR, Sudan and South Sudan, to mention 
only some, are all regional conflicts. And yet, UN peacekeeping opera-
tions generally have a single-state focus. Militarily defeating an armed 
group in a particular state could move some of their operations to 
neighbouring states – as seen in the past in the Middle East and in 
Africa. Given the cross-border nature of contemporary conflicts, the UN 
will need to examine the roles played by regional actors. While regional 
involvement has primarily been seen as positive, the UN should be 
wary of deploying peacekeepers to areas where they might be perceived 
as instruments of the policies of their own governments.  
 
Robust use of force 
 
John Karlsrud 
The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military 
premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the 
dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process 
that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction 
between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping 
operation and endanger its personnel.21 
At the strategic level, careful consideration should be given to what 
kind of instrument UN peacekeeping should be.22 Can the UN deploy 
peace enforcement operations? While that may be a tempting solution 
for members of the UN Security Council wanting to show leadership 
and resolve and with limited interest in engaging bilaterally or through 
regional organizations, equipping UN peacekeeping operations with 
                                                             
21  Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995) A/50/60-S/1995/1: Supplement to An Agenda for 
Peace. New York: United Nations, paragraph 35. 
22  Also see John Karlsrud (2015) ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of 
peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the 
DRC and Mali’, Third World Quarterly 36 (1): 40–54. 
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enforcement mandates that target particular groups should not be 
undertaken lightly. The use of force should be limited to critical 
instances when civilian populations are in grave and immediate 
danger. The urge to satisfy short-term objectives, like demonstrating 
that the UN Security Council and the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations are ‘doing something’, needs to be resisted. UN Security 
Council mandates should not specify any potential enemies. They 
should avoid including euphemisms like ‘neutralize’, and force should 
be used only for short periods in order to protect civilians.  
‘To a man with a hammer, the problem will look like a nail’. With the 
inclusion of the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC, the UN has got 
its hammer and has shown that it can use force against specified 
targets to ‘neutralize’ them. On the other hand, MINUSMA in Mali can 
be seen as a laboratory for incorporating some of the concepts and 
lessons learned from Afghanistan. It is essential to support this process 
by providing new arrivals to the UN with a better understanding of the 
similarities and differences between NATO and UN missions, and the 
need to take a less combative stance in Mali.  
Modern peacekeeping needs modern tools and technologies – 
including surveillance drones, tactical human intelligence teams and 
communicating with host populations through social media. However, 
there seems to be an unspoken linkage made between the inclusion of 
modern military capabilities and the more robust version of stabiliza-
tion, leaning towards peace enforcement. With the Western capabili-
ties, the MINUSMA mission is becoming more robust. But the robust 
posture may also have a self-fulfilling effect, drawing attention to the 
mission and increasing the likelihood of targeted attacks against the 
UN. In the longer term, retaliatory attacks may target the soft under-
belly of the UN – the funds, programmes and agencies that carry out 
development and humanitarian work.  
In 1993 John Ruggie warned that the UN had entered ‘a vaguely 
defined no man’s land lying somewhere between traditional peace-
keeping and enforcement – for which it lacks any traditional guiding 
operational concept’. 23 His warnings were not heeded, and the UN 
soon failed miserably in Srebrenica and in Rwanda. The solution to the 
problem was to come to a new understanding that impartiality should 
be understood from the perspective of protecting civilians, and that the 
UN could not stand idly by while atrocities were committed. The 
Brahimi Report held that the traditional principles ‘should remain the 
bedrock principles of peacekeeping’, but that peace operations should 
be sufficiently mandated with robust rules of engagement for civilian 
protection and have the necessary resources to react where civilians 
were in danger.  
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Today the UN finds itself in a similar predicament, taking on new 
tasks that border on peace enforcement. The question is whether the 
gap between principles and practice signify a need to update principles 
– or whether this is a case of practice leaving still-valid principles 
behind. 
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Section 4: Focus on civilians 
Protection of civilians: conceptual UNclarity  
 
Jon Harald Sande Lie and Benjamin de Carvalho 
Lack of conceptual clarity and a shared understanding of what the 
Protection of Civilians (PoC) means and entails for practice are key 
challenges to UN peacekeeping mandates, policies and practice. The 
PoC concept is a very broad one, and fails to orchestrate action between 
civilian and military entities. Instead, agencies interpret and apply PoC 
in terms of their own mandates and institutional culture, which 
impedes interagency coordination and contextual implementation. Few 
agree whether PoC is a specific peacekeeping task, or should be an 
overall concern of UN operations. Further, the lack of differentiation 
between PoC and the somewhat contested Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P)24 contributes to undermining PoC. The emergence of the Rights 
Up Front (RUF) agenda is not going to make that more clear. An 
essential task at the policy level is therefore to clarify the status and 
meaning of PoC as regards other tasks, concepts and protection 
concerns. 
Recent years have seen an increasing number of policy and 
doctrinal processes aimed at streamlining PoC. Combining the UN’s 
military capacities with the humanitarian ethics of protection can yield 
both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it makes the PoC 
framework more robust, putting greater political (and military) capital 
behind preventive protection efforts, while also enabling actual physi-
cal protection of civilians. On the other hand, it risks politicizing pro-
tection, conflating the UNs political–military agenda with the humani-
tarian agenda, thereby jeopardizing the humanitarian principles so 
central to the legitimacy of PoC.  
The protection of civilians is central to peacekeeping in seeking to 
manage war-to-peace transitions. This involves both civilian and mili-
tary entities, and a critical problem is the lack of a shared understand-
ing of what PoC means in and entails in practice. This is partly because 
the Security Council feared that defining and operationalizing PoC 
would make it too binding for member states, and could override the 
UN’s lack of resources. Hence it was never properly defined: instead, 
the Secretary-General opted for mainstreaming a ‘culture of protection’ 
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throughout the UN system.25 The problem is that different actors 
interpret this culture differently and contextually, making interagency 
harmonization difficult. Mainstreaming PoC would require simplifying 
and defining the concept to make it more tangible. That, however, 
would entail the risk of undermining PoC’s malleability to provide 
protection in all situations with the necessary range of UN entities.  
PoC is broad, lacks tangibility, and has remained an elusive idea to 
many involved in peacekeeping. Accordingly, it has become a con-
ceptual battlefield with little agreement on the status of PoC, whether 
as a legal principle rooted in international humanitarian law, guide-
lines for humanitarian action, or a comprehensive doctrine includeing 
coercive means.26 This confusion is due to the fact that POC is vague 
and open to interpretation and contextualization.27 Furthermore, 
various actors keen to further legitimize the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) have been deliberately confusing the two concepts. While both 
the POC and R2P concepts are related as regards aims, there are clear 
differences between them. R2P is interventionist, POC is not. R2P faces 
the problem of legitimizing humanitarian intervention, which POC does 
not face. Disciples have therefore sought to attach or confuse the two in 
hopes of sharing in the broad legitimacy which POC has enjoyed but 
R2P has lacked.  
There is a crucial need for more grounded reflection on how to 
provide effective protection. If no concerted and central efforts are 
made within the UN to clarify conceptually how PoC, R2P and RUF 
relate to different agencies, contexts, policies and actions, UN peace-
keeping will have to deal with three related, often competing, ideas or 
cultures of protection – all well-intentioned, yet not clearly shared and 
defined so as to enable contextual, sensitized and harmonized action.  
 
  
                                                             
25  See Jon Harald Sande Lie and Benjamin De Carvalho (2010) ‘Between culture and 
concept: the protection of civilians in Sudan’, Journal of International Peacekeeping 
14(1–2): 60–85. 
26  Jon Harald Sande Lie (2012) ‘The knowledge battlefield of protection’, African 
Security 5(3–4): 142–159. 
27  Benjamin de Carvalho and Jon Harald Sande Lie (2011) ‘Chronicle of a frustration 
foretold? The implementation of a broad protection agenda in the United Nations’, 
Journal of International Peacekeeping 15: 341–362. 
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Protection of civilians: from generic to context-specific 
approaches 
 
Cedric de Coning 
No other goal more clearly captures the ethos of what UN peacekeeping 
should be about than Protection of Civilians (PoC). And yet, exactly 
how the UN should protect civilians has remained ambiguously 
complex, posing challenging ethical dilemmas. As a result, peace-
keepers have generally opted for a more cautious approach at the 
operational and tactical levels.28  
The most serious challenge for the PoC role is the inherent tension in 
relations between the peacekeeping mission and national authorities. 
Missions are dependent on the consent of the host government and are 
mandated to support the local security forces that have primary 
responsibility for protecting the citizenry. In missions like UNAMID in 
Darfur or UNMISS in South Sudan, where the UN shelters civilians who 
feel at risk from government forces, or where the government is 
complicit in attacks on civilians, UN peacekeepers are placed in an 
impossible position: carrying out their mandate may result in armed 
confrontation with host government forces.29 Such incidents may result 
in a loss of consent, and the UN’s continued ability to protect civilians. 
The UN leadership is thus forced to confront the ethical dilemma where 
the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. 
 The tension between the mission and the host government can 
be better managed politically through clear and iterative com-
munication with national and local authorities, so that they are 
aware of the mission’s PoC mandate and how it will approach 
situations where civilians are at risk of imminent violence.  
 Uniformed peacekeepers can be better prepared to use the mis-
sion-specific SOPs and Rule of Engagements that have been 
developed for PoC. This is best done in mission contexts by 
bringing the relevant officers at different levels of command 
together to fine-tune their responses to various scenarios.  
 The UN should improve its engagement with troop and police 
contributing countries and discuss with them how their peace-
keepers are expected to act when faced with various PoC 
scenarios. 
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A second challenge is the tension between peacekeeping and humani-
tarian approaches to PoC. Although these differences are deeply rooted 
in principle and doctrine, and cannot really be resolved, past experi-
ence has shown that relations can be managed through meaningful 
coordination. The aim should not be to arrive at a common approach, 
but to bring both sides to a point where they respect the role and 
contribution of the other and therefore recognize the need to coexist 
and coordinate. Acting robustly against those who threaten civilians is 
likely to result in displacements and other negative consequences for 
civilians, especially when the aggressors are embedded within civilian 
populations, like the FDLR in eastern DRC.  
 Mission PoC strategies should not shy away from these 
tensions, but be explicit about the efforts they will apply in 
dealing with them.  
 Mechanisms need to be in place where potential differences can 
be managed on a case-by-case basis.  
 A culture of frank and open dialogue should be developed, 
based on mutual recognition and respect. 
Peacekeeping mission strategies have shown a lack of appreciation for 
the capacity of host communities to manage their own protection. In 
fact, local societies will have developed coping strategies for protection 
before the deployment of the mission, and will continue to apply such 
approaches after the mission has withdrawn. There has been too little 
focus on how to assess the population’s own perception of threats and 
protection needs 
 Mission PoC strategies should be more sensitive to how they 
can support local protection capacities, as opposed to imposing 
their own ideas and approaches on host communities.  
 POC strategies should be more sensitive to the unintended 
consequences of mission actions, and be more proactive in 
monitoring the impact they are having, including possible side-
effects.30 
Comparison of the PoC strategies of several missions reveals how 
generic guidance needs to be applied differently in specific contexts, 
and how consideration should be given to the time-period, or phase, in 
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which the mission finds itself.31 These findings point to the need for a 
shift from generic guidelines to a mission-specific and case-by-case 
approach to Protection of the Civilians.  
Lastly, the Security Council must take care not to use PoC as a 
justification for using UN peacekeepers to protect governments against 
radical Islamist insurgents, as it is doing in Mali (MINUSMA). That will 
inevitably result in politicizing the PoC agenda. 
 
Mass atrocities and gender 
 
Eli Stamnes 
UN peace operations may be deployed to setting where mass atrocities 
(war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide) 
occur or are about to take place. Such atrocities invariably have gender 
dimensions. In order to address these comprehensively, the UN must 
understand gender from two perspectives, guided by the questions 
‘where are the women?’ and ‘how does gender work? In the context of 
mass atrocities, the first perspective involves identifying women’s 
experiences in connection with mass atrocities and taking into account 
their roles as agents for preventing and protecting against such 
atrocities – as well as in the commissioning of them. The second gender 
perspective involves investigating what work gender is doing in the 
context of mass atrocities. For example: how are combat strategies, the 
treatment of individuals of the enemy group, or sexual and gender-
based violence (SGBV), based on and serve to maintain or cement 
certain notions of femininity and masculinity? Here, ‘gender’ is not 
understood as simply women’s issues, but as the socially constructed 
hierarchies of gendered identities. 
In practical terms, the first gender perspective (‘where are the 
women?’) means:  
 consciously looking for women, making sure that a male-as-
norm approach is not taken 
 identifying how mass atrocities impact on women in specific 
instances, rather than relying on abstract models that may 
obstruct observation of what is really going on  
 widening the lenses used in identifying potential mass atrocity 
situations to include the experiences of women 
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 moving beyond the women-as-victims stereotype. 
 acknowledging the role of women as active agents in preven-
tion and protection activities, and ensuring their participation 
at all levels of the spectrum of instruments and strategies, 
utilizing already existing knowledge and policies for women’s 
participation developed in connection with the implementation 
of UNSCR Resolution 1325  
 identifying the specific roles women assume in the commission 
of mass atrocities.  
In practical terms, the second gender perspective (‘how does gender 
work?’) means:  
 conscious investigation of the role played by the construction of 
gender identities in the commission of mass atrocities – e.g. 
how sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) can be under-
stood as violent assertions of masculinity 
 taking into account a whole new set of warning signs: indica-
tions of a hyper-masculinized environment and indications that 
assertions of masculinity may turn violent, as these are often 
precursors for ethnic cleansing and genocide. Such signs 
include:  
o growing polarization of gender roles in society  
o a change in gender power relations to the detriment of the 
feminine  
o gendered propaganda and hate speech, with clear assertions 
of masculinity and denigration of femininity  
o media ‘scapegoating’ of females  
o ‘feminization’, through words and deeds, of the enemy 
group’s men. 
Further, the second gender perspective (‘how does gender work?’) 
means: 
 Measures should be developed for dealing with the intersection 
of gender and ethnicity as well as other identities.  
 When dealing with SGBV, the structures of domination that 
allows for SGBV to take place must be the primary focus. Other-
wise, measures will only act as a temporary quick-fix solution.  
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 There should also be measures aimed at making hypermascu-
line language unacceptable.  
Whereas the first perspective is increasingly gaining ground within the 
UN, through the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325, the second 
perspective may be harder to grasp and to implement. However, if it is 
to deal with the gender dimensions that lie at the core of mass 
atrocities, the UN cannot shy away from a comprehensive gender 
approach that includes both perspectives.32 
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 Section 5: Sustaining peace 
Inclusion of local perceptions  
 
Niels Nagelhus Schia, John Karlsrud and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik 
The international community needs to do more in systematically 
collecting, sharing and analysing local perceptions, and ensuring that 
they are used in monitoring progress towards key benchmarks.33 
Further, they must inform decision-making at the field level and at the 
UN Security Council and UN Secretariat/Headquarters (HQ). Here are 
some practical recommendations for policymakers and the internatio-
nal community: 
 Integrate. The UN should ‘mainstream’ local perceptions into 
political analysis and planning at the mission level and at HQ 
New York HQ.  
 Knowledge sharing: between New York HQ, mission HQs and 
the field.  
 Nationals and internationals: Although not neutral, national 
staff and the local population are the ‘real’ experts on local per-
ceptions.  
 Political buy-in: Too much focus on the field might lead to a dis-
connect with the political elites. It is crucial to involve the 
political elites into the bottom–up approach. 
 Infrastructure and partnership: The UN should establish 
partnerships with national universities and researchers, to 
strengthen capacity and improve the analysis of data.  
 Methodological approach – Outsourcing: Capturing local 
perceptions through surveys requires methodological expertise.  
 Methodological approach – In-house: To be able to carry out 
and interpret surveys, staff must be qualified and trained 
properly.  
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 Expertise: UN needs a mechanism that can ensure good 
partnerships. Two ways of establishing partnerships could be 
envisaged: in-house capacity to work with partners and out-
source surveys; working with consultants (for instance, UNMIL 
has worked with academics, the World Bank and others).  
 Transparency of research, data and findings should be the rule, 
not the exception.  
 Funding. Funds for capturing local perceptions through surveys 
and the like should be entered into the budget and coordinated 
with the UN Country Team (UNCT).  
The increased focus by policymakers on understanding and capturing 
local perceptions has sparked discussion on how UN peacekeeping 
may go about this more systematically. This debate may enhance local 
trust in peacekeeping missions, bolstering the legitimacy and sustain-
ability of peacebuilding processes. However, it may also nurture a more 
proactive mission approach to activities that will inevitably connect 
link with local processes, forces, traditions, customs and groups of 
people, while disconnecting others. Because it may have effects on the 
existing power structures in the host country, the focus on local percep-
tions requires careful handling, to avoid bringing more stress to local 
communities.  
 
Security sector reform  
 
Kari M. Osland 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has often been presented as a panacea for 
achieving sustainable development after a war. This is because SSR has 
been perceived as a separate discipline, encompassing elements of the 
larger peace- and state building agenda, bridging the gap between 
security and development. Such an understanding places too much 
responsibility on the concept itself, making it one more among many 
complex, unattainable goals.  
Rather, SSR should be perceived as an integrated approach 
involving certain major principles: 
 human security at its core 
 balancing effectiveness and accountability 
 recognizing the inter-linked nature of the system  
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 recognizing the political nature of such reform.34  
By keeping human security at its core – the first principle listed above – 
it can help to reinforce a focus on protection of civilians as the centre of 
gravity in a peace operation. The second principle, balancing between 
effectiveness and accountability, is challenged in situations where 
there is no peace to keep. The basic assumption is that some security 
must be created first, for development to happen.35 However, if 
accountability is not made an integral part of this process right from 
the start, it will be an uphill struggle to set about introducing this after 
some degree of security has been established. As for the third principle, 
having a holistic approach to the reforms refers to an undeniable truth: 
there is little point in reforming the police if neither the judicial nor the 
penal system is functional. The last principle, the political nature of 
these reforms, recognizes the security sector as part of the state sector 
and the state-sanctioned use of force.  
At UN headquarters, the SSR unit should be placed with the Under-
Secretary General. In the field, it should be part of the office of the 
Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG). This will under-
line the political nature of SSR and to ensure linkages between sectors 
such as the police, military and civilian components.  
The possibilities for influencing potential obstacles through the SSR 
intervention are limited. Therefore, the goals of SSR must be linked to 
the wider process of peace- and statebuilding, so that these processes 
can reinforce rather than contradict each other. In addition, the man-
dates should be specifically tailored and needs-based, realistically 
reflecting what is possible to achieve in the short term. At the same 
time, an SSR intervention should assist in developing a long-term goal, 
supporting the host-state in its efforts to establish a national vision and 
strategy focused on accountable institutions. 
A central challenge related to SSR is connected to national owner-
ship as vital to the legitimacy and sustainability of SSR processes. This 
implies that the host-state is the main interlocutor in developing and 
implementing SSR. However, such a focus may exclude other key 
stakeholders, like customary and informal providers of security and 
justice. Perhaps up to 80% of security and justice providers in sub-
Saharan Africa are non-state actors. Therefore, it is important to move 
ownership beyond a state-centric focus. On the other hand, such an 
                                                             
34  See Cedric de Coning, Kari M. Osland and Paul Troost (2015) The Security Sector 
Reform Concept in a New Development Partnership. PeaceCap Report, forthcoming.  
35  Kari M. Osland, Graham Thompson and Andreas Vogt (2007) Joint Donor Security 
Sector Needs Assessment (JDSSNA). An independent assessment of the future 
involvement of the Joint Donor Team in security sector reform in Southern Sudan. 
NUPI Report: Security in Practice, No 1, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs.  
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approach may be perceived as undermining the already weak authority 
of the state in question – and it is questionable how many UN member 
states would be willing to legitimize non-state actors within their own 
country.  
 
Police reform 
 
Kari M. Osland 
International police assistance mandates have changed over the 
decades, from monitoring to support reform of police organizations. In 
today’s complex environments, the challenges are many and varied. My 
main recommendations are as follows: 
Strategic level: 
 Recognize that in a short time frame, it is mainly within the 
more technical part of the police reform that change can reason-
ably be expected. This does not exclude the need for concurrent 
work aimed at long-term goals regarding accountability and 
governance, which should be seen as generational issues. 
 Target the assistance, with smaller, more specialized and mixed 
teams.  
 Maintain a division between the host-state’s civilian police 
service and its military force. 
 Continue to promote a coherent approach across bilateral and 
multilateral assistance.36  
Training and recruitment: 
 In-mission training should be emphasized, in order to enable 
officers to develop and master the needed skills. 
 Put more emphasis on mentoring, as part of pre-deployment or 
in-mission training.  
 Match skills to mission requirements.37 
                                                             
36  Kari M. Osland (2004) The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: 
Giovanna Bono and Ståle Ulriksen (eds.) The EU, Crisis Management and Peace 
Support Operations. Special Issue of Journal of International Peacekeeping 11 (2): 
544–560. 
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 Provide the host police with operational, practical training, and 
less theoretical training.  
Whereas there is evidence of positive changes regarding the more 
technical parts of international assistance to police reform  (training, 
rebuilding and equipping), there is little evidence of success in dealing 
with longer-term issues that require changes in attitudes, orientation 
and behaviour.38  
Today, where it is only exceptionally that there is a peace to keep, it 
is important for the UN to adapt, and to deploy more specialized and 
mixed police teams in addition to Formed Police Units and individual 
police officers. These specialized teams should be multidisciplinary, to 
ensure the right type of support to police missions. And it goes without 
saying that all support should be targeted according to the needs of the 
host-state. 
In addition, especially in conflict environments, it is important to 
maintain a distinction between a civilian police service and a military 
force, where the centre of gravity for the police service should be the 
same as for the UN mission: protection of civilians. Because there is 
such a diversity of police traditions among the police-contributing 
countries (PCC), the UN – before mission and in mission – should 
continue to promote a coherent approach across bilateral and 
multilateral assistance. 
With regard to training, it should be recognized that UN police 
deployments are at the same time assistance missions and a means for 
developing policing capacity in the PCCs. Precisely because many 
officers come to the peace operation with little mission-specific train-
ing, in-mission training is a way of ensuring a certain level of mission-
specific competence.  
The mentor arrangement is a central part of building capacity in a 
host-state. Greater emphasis needs to be put on training the mentors in 
the art of mentoring, lest the arrangement do more harm than good. 
Connected to this is the importance of matching skills to mission 
requirements, by developing specific job descriptions for UNPOL posts, 
in order to ensure recruitment that can fulfil specific tasks. 
                                                             
37  Halvor Hartz, Henning Høgseth and Kari M. Osland (2007) NORAF – lærdommer og 
anbefalinger. En uavhengig vurdering på oppdrag for Politidirektoratet. NUPI 
Report: Security in Practice, No. 7. Oslo: NUPI. 
38  Kari M. Osland (2014) Much Ado About Nothing? The Impact of International 
Assistance to Police reform in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Serbia and South Sudan. A Comparative Case Study and Developing a Model for 
Evaluating Democratic Policing. PhD dissertation, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Oslo/Akademika Publishing. 
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A final point here is that police forces in many post-conflict host-
states have low literacy levels,39 making traditional school-bench 
training of little or no value. It is essential that all training be 
conducted in a practical and suitably contextualized way.  
 
Gender  
 
Randi Solhjell 
Today’s gender perspectives in UN peace operations serve more to 
exclude than include, with little or no inclusion of men and mascu-
linity. Such an approach has negative repercussions also on women, as 
it removes discussions about gender from mainstream debates and 
policies. The problem stems in part from the wording of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325, with the terms ‘gender’ and ‘women’ applied 
interchangeably. The Panel will need to address gender perspectives 
beyond those affecting women in particularly vulnerable situations 
(usually gender-based violence) or women in need of empowerment in 
host states (e.g. electoral quotas). Gender perspectives need to be 
recognized as a tool for understanding the interconnected lives of men 
and women in conflict and post-conflict situations. Missions should be 
encouraged to develop a truly integrated approach to gender.  
Experience from MONUSCO, the UN operation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, provides an example of good intentions gone 
wrong. In recent years, an innovative form of peacekeeping has been 
developed: Community Liaison Assistants (CLA). These are Congolese 
nationals with high expertise in language, conflict resolution and 
diplomatic skills. They connect the international peacekeepers (civilian 
and military) with the ‘locals’ and vice versa. 40 On a daily basis, these 
liaison assistants are confronted with a range of gender-relation 
aspects and gendered security concerns, such as negotiating with 
customary chiefs, the role of men as protectors, and socioeconomic 
factors for men, women, children and the elderly in villages exposed to 
roaming armed groups.  
However, instead of an integrated approach to gender, MONUSCO 
has supported CLAs with one person in charge of ‘gender issues’: the 
Gender Focal Point.41 In practice, that created a perception of ‘gender-
as-women’, leading the male-dominated group of CLAs to assume that 
gender has nothing to do with their normal work: gender issues are 
something to be relegated to the Gender Focal Point. The main role of 
                                                             
39  Ibid. 
40  For more on the CLAs, see Randi Solhjell and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik (2014) 
Female Bodies and Masculine Norms. Oslo, NUPI. Report no 2.  
41  This research was conducted in September/October 2013.  
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the latter is to establish, in each peacekeeping base, a network of 
women's associations to identify the challenges that women face and to 
propose strategies and measures. It is evident that gender is under-
stood as mainly women, and that dealing with women’s concerns is 
best done through women’s associations.42 What is less clear is how 
the entire society can be actively involved in mapping and putting 
forward ideas concerning protection.  
Improving this at the level of implementation and performance 
measurement will require systematic disaggregated gender indicators 
and targets. Here, MONUSCO also needs to broaden its scope on gender 
– which at the time of my research appeared narrow, characterizing 
gender as something ‘particular’, ‘special protection for women’ and 
‘sexual’. Gender relations could not be recognized as something that 
may facilitate and/or obstruct wanted outcomes.  
Some of the insecurities facing Congolese women can be dealt with 
only if men are included in the discussion. For instance, Congolese 
men need to be engaged in what have been considered ‘feminine tasks’ 
– fetching water and charcoal, going to markets, harvesting etc. – as 
these present major daily security risks for women and girls. I hold that 
MONUSCO needs senior leadership to push for inclusive gender 
perspectives across all UN sections and to work systematically on this 
through CLAs, and not just their Gender Focal Points. 
 
                                                             
42  Research conducted through fieldwork using documents, interviews and 
participant observation. Published in Randi Solhjell and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik 
(2014) and Solhjell (2014) ‘”Sin mujeres por aquí”. Discursos de género en las 
Operaciones de Paz de Naciones Unidas’ (There are no women here. Gender 
discourses in UN peace operations), Relaciones Internacionales 27.  
 Section 6: UN internal systems and 
processes 
Civilian capacity  
 
Cedric de Coning and Paul Troost 
UN peace operations are associated with the blue-hatted uniformed UN 
personnel – but civilian capacity is crucial to success in areas such as 
politics, justice, core government functionality, reconciliation, human 
rights, security sector reform and economic revitalization.  
Although the UN CIVCAP reform initiative failed to bring about 
much-needed innovation, several recommendations in the Guehénno 
report remain relevant and urgent.43 Building on our research, we will 
highlight the following points:44 
 International capacity should not become a substitute for 
national capacity. A peace operation has failed if it withdraws 
without leaving behind enhanced national capacities in areas 
critical for peace consolidation. 
 UN civilian staffing tables are based on outdated planning 
templates. Fast-changing needs call for context-specific 
innovative planning and responsive recruiting processes. 
 The UN needs to broaden its resource pool and adapt its 
recruitment needs to match, inter alia, that of the providers of 
South–South Government Provided Personnel (GPP). 
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Establishing resilient functioning state institutions like a ministry of 
justice and court system, or a ministry of finance and tax system, 
should be a key priority for any society in transition. UN peace opera-
tions should support the development of these institutions, including 
short-, medium- and long-term plans to develop the civilian capacity 
need to staff these institutions. No single factor is more important than 
the development of local institutional capacity to ensure context-
sensitive approaches, local ownership, continuity and longevity. 
International civilian capacity can assist in establishing such 
institutions and can help to prepare local civilian capacity, but should 
not be a substitute for national capacity.  
Whereas the training of police officers is accepted as part of peace 
operations, very few peace operations, other than the transitional 
administrations in Timor-Leste and in Kosovo, have engaged in deve-
loping local civilian capacity. Peace operations should become a driv-
ing force in the development of local civilian capacity, together with all 
other partners with a stake in this aspect, because developing resilient 
state institutions is a critical dimension of peace consolidation.  
How can the UN improve the professionalism and relevance of its 
international and local civilian staff? One aspect in need of a critical 
overhaul is civilian staffing templates. Despite vast differences in con-
text, almost every UN peace operation has the same staffing table. Civi-
lian staffing tables should be designed according to need, not supply. 
A further aspect concerns the quality of personnel. The UN can 
expect staff to have received specialized training and have relevant 
experience for the task at hand. The UN should advertise in and recruit 
from its global resource base, instead of lazily drawing on an almost-
incestuous New York diplomatic pool. Our research on the capacity of 
emerging actors found that whereas relevant civilian capacity is 
increasingly available for international use, it is underutilized because 
of lack of information on modalities and opportunities.45  
Further, we found that people with technical knowhow and langu-
age skills appropriate for many of the conflict areas where the UN 
experience significant vacancy rates are potentially available in the 
form of specialized teams or as individuals through the GPP modality. 
The UN urgently needs to improve how it makes requests to govern-
ments to provide experienced personnel in these areas, and clarify 
under what conditions such personnel will do their work.  
                                                             
45  NUPI is a member of the Peace Capacities Network, which consists of research 
institutions from Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Norway, Russia, South Africa and 
Turkey. The baseline study of the civilian capacity of emerging actors is available at 
www.peacecap.org.  
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Implementing these recommendations will be possible only if the 
institutional limitations of the UN are recognized, and the potential of 
local and South–South capacity provision are fully realized.  
 
Measuring and evaluation  
 
Kari M. Osland 
Recent experiences with peace operations show that it is almost impos-
sible to succeed in building peace if war is raging at the same time. 
Particularly in such environments, it is crucial to have realistic ambi-
tions, and aim for small changes. Further, because there is no consen-
sus on when, where and what to prioritize, how UN operations are 
evaluated matters. Instead of counting the number of people who have 
been trained and whether ‘democratic’ elections have been held, we 
should look for more incremental changes over time. It is important to 
acknowledge and reward those in charge, so as to encourage further 
progress – in particular, with changes initiated and carried out with the 
host-state in the driver´s seat, and where a long-term perspective is 
needed to recognize sustainable change. Often, the forces obstructing 
peaceful change are so massive that even limited success should be 
welcomed and reinforced. It is not only that small changes should be 
nurtured: also commitment to undertake change should be recog-
nized.46  
Further, we must acknowledge that working on development, 
security and justice reform is not going to be effective use of aid. There 
is considerable risk that the investments made may not lead to 
sustainable reform. However, even if success is only partial, the 
consequences may be high for the individuals concerned, and the 
danger involved in doing nothing will probably be greater. 
There is a gap between the kinds of indicators used by various parts 
of the UN system on the one side, and the perceptions of the host 
government and not least its population, on the other. In attempting to 
measure and assess peace operations, it should be understood that 
while multilateral organizations, NGOs and individual donor-countries 
may need to evaluate their efforts to be accountable to their own 
constituencies, it is the population in the post-conflict states that will 
benefit or suffer, depending on the effectiveness of a peace operation. 
That makes it essential to ensure that ‘measured results’ do not deviate 
                                                             
46  Kari M. Osland (2014) Much Ado About Nothing? The impact of international 
assistance to police reform in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Serbia and South Sudan. A Comparative Case Study and Developing a Model for 
Evaluating Democratic Policing. PhD dissertation, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Oslo/Akademika Publishing. 
Mateja Peter, ed. 
 
40 
too much from the results actually experienced by the local population. 
The indicators must be relevant to the context within which they are 
applied.  
Moreover, there must be clarity about the underlying purpose of 
measurement. Is it intended to feed the results back in to the mission to 
improve doctrine, or is it outcome-oriented, focused on assessing 
whether the mission has achieved its goals? A particular challenge 
emerges here: the problem of attribution. It is difficult to prove the 
causal effect in general, but it is also difficult to prove the effects of 
resources put into one segment of the intervention compared to the 
larger peace operation, or to identify what may be due to factors other 
than the presence of a peace operation. Additionally, it is often very 
difficult to obtain reliable and valid information.  
It should also be noted that measuring progress might be subject to 
political interference. This could come from the host government, 
which might have an interest in presenting the country as being below 
or above a certain threshold – but also from the donor side, wanting to 
see its engagement presented as successful and thereby an argument 
for further funding, or as proof that it has accomplished its work, as an 
argument for an exit-strategy. 
 
 Section 7: Partnerships and 
transitions 
AU–UN strategic partnership  
 
Cedric de Coning 
The most important regional relationship for the United Nations is that 
with the African Union (AU). African capacities are an major resource 
for UN peacekeeping, currently contributing approximately 45% of the 
UN’s uniformed personnel, 60% of its international civilian personnel 
and 80% of its local staff. UN support is a critical enabler for AU opera-
tions, and the UN is an important exit strategy partner for the AU. The 
effectiveness of both the UN and the AU are thus mutually interdepen-
dent on several levels. The UN will have to consider more predictable 
ways in which the UN and other partners can support AU and regional 
peace operations, like the MJTF operations against Boko Haram.47 
At the strategic level, the UN and AU should foster a common 
narrative that is mutually reinforcing and respectful of the roles of 
each. At the operational level the UN and AU can develop joint 
guidelines on transitions. Such an agreed joint approach can make it 
easier for both organizations to involve each other from the earliest 
stages – in assessments, planning, coordination mechanisms, mission 
support, benchmarks and evaluation. 
More efforts are needed to find creative and innovative ways of 
supporting African peace operations. For instance, the UN could make 
some of its Department of Field Service capabilities available to the AU, 
including its Brindisi and Kampala logistical depots; it could include 
the AU in some on-call procurement arrangements, for instance strate-
gic airlift; and partner with the AU in developing essential mission 
support planning and managing capabilities in the AU Commission and 
AU missions. 
African peace operations represent local responses to global pro-
blems. Most African conflicts are global in the sense that they are 
heavily influenced, if not driven, by external factors. These include the 
global war on terror; the exploitation of natural resources by multi-
nationals; capital flight facilitated and solicited by the international 
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banking system, and transnational organized crime, driven by markets 
in the West for narcotics, human trafficking, timber and illegally 
caught fish. Effective African peace operations thus represent a signifi-
cant contribution to the global common good.  
A partnership model has emerged whereby the AU and regional 
entities, with support from the UN and partners, have acted as first 
responders to African crises, as in Burundi, CAR, Darfur and Mali. Once 
basic stability had been achieved these missions were handed over to 
the UN, and the African military and police peacekeepers were re-
hatted and became UN peacekeepers.48 Somalia has been the excep-
tion, as sufficient stability has not yet been achieved to trigger a hand-
over to the UN. However, the AU and UN are jointly developing bench-
marks for a future transition. In the meantime, AMISOM and UNSOM 
are working closely together, and both are supported by UNSOA. 
The AU lacks predictable funding for its peace operations. That 
dilemma impacts negatively on the UN, which had to – as a last resort – 
take over the AU’s missions in Mali and CAR earlier than if the AU 
missions had been supplied with sufficient resources. As a result the 
UN had to deploy stabilization-type missions that forced it to go beyond 
its peacekeeping principles and doctrine. 
 
Gender and AU–UN partnership  
 
Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik  
Some 15 years after UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace 
and Security, gender mainstreaming remains a great challenge in peace 
operations. This is evident not only internally in operations but also in 
connection with executing the given mandate. There is increasing 
recognition that the inclusion of gender perspectives – how men and 
women experience and are affected by conflict and war, and their 
various roles and contributions to violence and to peace – is crucial to 
the path to sustainable peace. Gender perspectives and gender main-
streaming need to become integrated in all types of peace operations, 
from the initial stages including pre-assessments, conflict mappings 
and mission planning across the various components.  
Today, gender is included as a separate ‘add-on’ component often 
after peacekeepers have been deployed on the ground. Peace opera-
tions are still highly military and masculine in nature, with gender seen 
as a secondary priority and not a crucial factor in providing security 
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and stability in conflict areas. In turn, gender and gender mainstream-
ing become the ‘sole’ responsibility of the gender unit or gender 
officers. UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have taken positive steps 
in including gender dimensions in their own missions, but including 
gender perspectives and ensuring gender mainstreaming is equally 
important in UNSC-mandated missions not executed by the UN itself. 
The UN-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a 
clear example of a PSO where gender and gender mainstreaming 
constitute an add-on component. Although the mission arrived in 
Somalia in 2007, it was not until 2012 that a gender officer – the first 
gender officer in an AU PSO – was deployed.49 The gender officer then 
set about developing, from scratch, the first gender strategy for the 
mission.50 A gender strategy is an important tool and point of 
departure in the work towards achieving a more gender-sensitive and 
mainstreamed mission. The absence of a gender strategy and the late 
arrival of a gender officer clearly show that gender was not a prioritized 
component when the mission was planned and set up.  
In addition, as is the case in many other peace operations, 
AMISOM’s gender officer has been seen as the de facto ‘gender respons-
ible’ in the mission, rather than having the intended advisory role. 
Compared to the UN, the AU is lagging behind as regards work and 
focus on gender. However, AMISOM is a UNSC- mandated mission, so 
the UN should focus on promoting gender dimensions to ensure that 
gender perspectives are integrated into all parts of the mission, from 
the planning stages to the actual execution of the mandate. 
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